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In this paper we present a budget-constrained optimal control model aimed at
finding the optimal enforcement profile for a street-level, illicit drug crackdown
operation. The objective is defined as minimizing the number of dealers dealing at
the end of the crackdown operation, using this as a surrogate measure of residual
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criminal activity. Analytical results show that optimal enforcement policy will
invariably use the budget resources completely. Numerical analysis using realistic
estimates of parameters shows that crackdowns normally lead to significant results
within a matter of a week, and if they do not, it is likely that they will be offering
very limited success even if pursued for a much longer duration. We also show that
a ramp-up enforcement policy will be most effective in collapsing a drug market if
the drug dealers are risk-seeking, and the policy of using maximum enforcement as
early as possible is usually optimal in the case when the dealers are risk averse or
risk neutral. The work then goes on to argue that the underlying model has some
general characteristics that are both reasonable and intuitive, allowing possible
applications in focused, local enforcement operations on other similar illegal
activities.  2000 Academic Press
1. INTRODUCTION
Illicit drugs continue to impose a significant cost on our society. Today,
it is perhaps one of the greatest challenges confronting the law enforce-
ment officials, social activists, and citizens. Increasing taxpayer resources
are being spent to confront the illicit drug trade and its associated crimes.
The choice of most effective enforcement strategies, i.e., local vs border
 control, enforcement vs treatment 18 , and education, while important
questions, is not the focus of this paper.
Despite differences in emphasis and paradigms of the political adminis-
trations, resources spent on local enforcement continue to grow. Many
observers, politicians, and researchers attribute the recent reduction of
crime in the United States to greater and more effective police presence
on the streets. With this viewpoint gaining ground, especially with ongoing
positive results, increased streetlocal enforcement may be a trend that we
will continue to see. However, the bad news is that there is mounting
pressure on law enforcement agencies to demonstrate results especially in
‘‘problem’’ neighborhoods. Achieving these results may require use of
decision-aids that enable identification and evaluation of innovative, effi-
cacious enforcement strategies to ‘‘recover’’ high-crime neighborhoods.
Ž .  The Drug Market Analysis DMA study 16 in Jersey City, NJ, showed a
strong impact of novel policing strategy in reducing crime indicators and
calls for emergency service, underscoring the importance of pursuing
tactics that are innovative.
One strategy that continues to be used, often as a first step to revitaliza-
tion of neighborhoods, is a drug crackdowni.e., concentration of en-
 forcement resources in a geographic area for a limited time 20 or for
 focusing on specific types of crime 16 . However, for the purpose of this
paper we will use the restricted definition of focusing on a geographic
area. The limited studies done thus far on crackdowns can be categorized
into two groupsevaluating the impact of a crackdown operation 1, 6, 9,
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12, 16, 21 and modeling the effect of crackdown on illicit drug markets
 25, 14 . This paper extends the work in the second category by modeling
the impact of such crackdowns based on Caulkins’ utility-based, dynamic
Ž .model for predicting the flow of drug dealers into out of a drug market as
a function of dealers’ profit and the enforcement risk.
Caulkins’ model lends itself to optimal control literature especially to
address the question of optimal time trajectory of enforcement during a
   crackdown operation. Prior work by Baveja et al. 2 and Kort et al. 14
Žused the objective of minimizing the enforcement resources objective
.function with a constraint of collapsing the drug market. In reality,
however, law enforcement budget may be fixed and is better modeled via a
 constraint in an optimization model. Furthermore, some policy experts 13
argue that drug policy should focus on how best to ‘‘manage’’ the problem
and the slogan ‘‘war on drugs’’ is misplaced. Consistent with this philoso-
phy, the current work focuses attention on reducing the size of a drug
market to as small as possible subject to the restriction of the law
enforcement budget and a pre-specified time for the crackdown operation.
Thus this research is dealing with a more realistic optimization scenario to
the important problem of illicit drug crackdowns, consistent with the
viewpoint put forth by some leading drug policy researchers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we will
briefly review Caulkins’ crackdown model along with some of its underly-
ing dynamics. Section 3 will formulate the optimal control model investi-
gated in this paper following which we will present generalized analytical
conditions for optimality. Section 5 will look at application of these
conditions to determine the optimal enforcement policies utilizing example
data. Finally we discuss the implications of this work along with the
inherent limitations and directions for future work.
2. CAULKINS’ DYNAMICS
 Caulkins 5 considers a province or larger city with a large number of
identical dealers that are spread over a large number of drug markets.
Each day every dealer goes to the market that offers the best opportu-
nity. This is not only determined by the expected dollar profit but also by
non-monetary factors such as risks of enforcement, threats of violence by
other market participants, etc. In the equilibrium, this ‘‘generalized profit’’
per dealer should be the same in all markets.
Consider the notation
  the equilibrium level of the generalized profit or0
the reservation wage.
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If in a certain market the generalized profit exceeds  , then new0
dealers will enter. On the other hand, if the generalized profit in a market
is below  , then dealers will leave.0
Further, if
N t  the number of dealers at time t in a certain marketŽ .
under consideration
 generalized profit per unit of sales in this market
 0 and constantŽ .
assuming that sales depend on the number of dealers in the following way,
N the number of sales per day provided that there are N dealers,
 where  0 and  0, 1 are constants,
then the generalized profit due to sales per dealer is NN.
The parameter  is a crucial one: the higher  the more total sales of
the market depend on the number of dealers. If  1 the drug market is
a sellers’ market where each dealer brings his own customers with him. If
Ž 0 the total number of customers in the market is fixed buyers’
.market and thus independent of the number of dealers. In the latter case
it is less attractive for a dealer to enter such a market if the number of
dealers active in this market is already large.
Also, if
E t  enforcement effort associated with the crackdown at time t , andŽ .
 parameter associated with per dealer cost of enforcement effort
 0 and constant ,Ž .
then the generalized net profit per dealer incorporating risk due to
 Ž .enforcement is N N EN . Clearly, the effect of crackdown
efforts completely depends on the value of  . It is assumed that the
burden of enforcement is equally shared among the dealers. This implies
that given the enforcement effort more enforcement pressure is felt by an
individual dealer in case there are only a few dealers active in the market.
Caulkins calls the case  1 that of risk-seeking dealers, while  1 and
 1 characterize risk-neutral and risk-averse dealers, respectively.
The well known Caulkins’ dynamics, defined for N 0, says that
E
1N˙ c N    , 1Ž .1 0ž /N
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where
c  the speed of adjustment parameter c  0 and constant .Ž .1 1
It is reasonable to assume that the parameters satisfy
  , 2Ž .0
since otherwise the market under consideration is not attractive and the
drug market will disappear even without a crackdown, obviously an unreal-
Ž .istic case. From 1 it is clear that whether the value of  exceeds one or
not will determine if there are decreasing or increasing returns to scale of
enforcement activities.
Ž .Before we formulate the optimization problem based on Eq. 1 , let us
discuss the dynamics that governs the dealer population a little further, as
it will help the analysis in the following sections.
Ž .For N 0, one can write 1 also as
c1 1  N˙ N  E   N . 3Ž .Ž .0N
ŽFrom this expression it can be obtained that a market collapse i.e.,
.N 0 is not possible if   1, since in this case the first term within
brackets goes to infinity when N approaches zero. If we assume for the
moment that   1 0, the situation can be illustrated in Fig. 1.
FIG. 1. The Caulkins’ dynamics. The bold line denotes stable states. ‘‘Pushing the balloon
a little’’ with low enforcement, ABCDA; the balloon is popped with high enforcement,
AEFG.
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Let us first compute the long-run equilibrium without enforcement, by
Ž .equating the part between parentheses in 3 to zero. This yields
11
N  . 4Ž .max ž /0
Clearly N can never be exceeded when starting below this value.max
Further, different steady state levels of N can be determined as a function
of the enforcement level. The highest enforcement level associated with a
positive steady state level of dealers leads to the following equilibrium
level for the number of dealers,
Ž . Ž . Ž .1 1 1 1 1 11    1 
N  1 N  ,min max ž /ž / ž /  0
5Ž .
Ž .where according to 3 the attractiveness of the market to new dealers is
particularly high. This is reflected by the fact that a very high enforcement
level is needed to keep the number of dealers constant. It is obvious that
N  0 is only defined for   1.min
In order to complete the discussion of the shape of the curve in Fig. 1,
Ž we note that it has an inflection point between N and N see 14, p.min max
.182 . However, the exact shape is not really important and it suffices to
know that it is bell shaped.
Ž .If starting from a situation point A in Fig. 1 with a high number of
dealers, e.g., N , then exerting a low enforcement effort means justmax
Ž .‘‘pushing the balloon a little’’ since the movement according to 3 is from
B to the new equilibrium level C. As soon as the crackdown is over,
enforcement jumps to zero and the solution jumps to point D from where
Ž .the previous equilibrium point A is again approached.
The ‘‘balloon is popped’’ only with high enforcement effort, since then
the movement is from point E to point F, where the dealer population is
Ž . Ž .extinct. Note that for N 0 the Caulkins’ dynamics 1 or 3 is not
defined, but we make the reasonable assumption that in such a situation
the dealer population would stay at zero level.
3. BUDGET-CONSTRAINED CRACKDOWN
OPTIMIZATION MODEL
Past optimization work based on Caulkins’ dynamic equation has fo-
cused on minimizing the enforcement resources subject to the constraint
of collapsing the drug market. However, the total enforcement budget
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available is rarely under the direct control of the law-enforcement deci-
sion-maker and often is a pre-specified resource. Typically, the objective of
a crackdown operation is to minimize the street drug dealing as much as
possible keeping within the budgetary constraint. Mathematically, this is a
new, uninvestigated, relevant problem requiring challenging optimization
solution methodologies. To specify the model, we need to define the
following additional parameters:
B budget available for the crackdown B 0 and constant ,Ž .
T horizon date T 0 and constant ,Ž .
r discount rate r 0 and constant .Ž .
Ž .The budget-constrained crackdown optimization model BCOM can be
written via the optimal control formulation
minimize er TN T , 6Ž . Ž .
subject to
E
1N˙ c N    , N 0 N , 7Ž . Ž .1 0 0ž /N
T
E t dt	 B. 8Ž . Ž .H
0
Alternatively, the objective could be extended by adding the discounted
integral of the number of dealers throughout the crackdown period. Since
Ž .such a crackdown period is usually short a week or so , we choose to
ignore the impact of number of dealers during the crackdown period in the
objective function.
Ž .Note that even though we have used N T in the objective function, it
Ž Ž ..  Ž .can be replaced by a function, f N T , with f  0 for all N T , without
changing the solution of the optimal enforcement profile. This is true,
Ž Ž .. Ž . because f N T is minimized by minimizing N T , since f  0. The
model also emphasizes that if the drug market is not collapsed at the end
Ž Ž . .of the crackdown operation i.e., N T  0 and no post-crackdown en-
forcementrecovery programs are in place, the gains achieved may be
quickly lost with the market bouncing back to a level of N . Therefore,max
in investigating this model we assume that a crackdown operation is
followed up by a phase 2 which targets improving lightinghousingfacili-
ties and bringing businessesresidents back into the area. It is reasonable
to assume that the cost of such a Phase 2 project is increasing in the
Ž .number of dealers remaining, N T . Note that this model is still valid even
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Ž .if the cost of the post-crackdown operation is non-linear in N T , provided
Ž .the reasonable property that the function is increasing in N T holds.
Ž .The isoperimetric constraint 8 can as usual be transformed into a
terminal value constraint by introducing a new state variable,
D t money spent on crackdown enforcement on 0, t .Ž . .
Incorporating this variable, we restate the formulation as
minimize er TN T , 6Ž . Ž .
subject to
E
1N˙ c N    , N 0 N , 7Ž . Ž .1 0 0ž /N
D˙ E, D 0  0, 9aŽ . Ž .
D T 	 B , 9bŽ . Ž .
with two states, N and D, and one control, E.
Ž . Ž .The exp rT term in the objective function 6 plays no role. It is
included because it does play a role in subsequent free end time versions
of the problem. For a fixed T , discounting does not change the optimal
Ž .solution as we will see, e.g., from 17 in Section 5.
Next, we investigate necessary conditions for the optimal trajectory.
4. NECESSARY OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS
In this section we employ optimal control theory to establish some
analytical results that will help us in understanding the dynamics of the
Žoptimal solution. We first formulate the Hamiltonian see, e.g., Feichtinger
 .and Hartl 8 ,
E
1H  c N      E, 10Ž .1 1 0 2ž /N
and obtain the necessary optimality conditions,
E maximizes H .
Since  ,  are shadow prices of the undesirable states, ‘‘number of1 2
dealers’’ and ‘‘budget already used,’’ respectively, it is reasonable to
Ž .consider  	 0,   0. Below 15 we show that these inequalities indeed1 2
Žhold. If we assume that  1, i.e., dealers are risk seeking the case of
OPTIMAL CONTROL OF CRACKDOWN 61
.
 1 will be considered separately in Sections 5 and 7 , we get
H  c E1N    0. 11Ž .E 1 1 2
Furthermore we have
2  1˙  r H     1 c N   c E N  r , 12Ž . Ž .1 1 N 1 1 1
˙  r H  r , 13Ž .2 2 D 2
 T 1, 14Ž . Ž .1
 T  , 
 0,  BD T  0. 15Ž . Ž . Ž .Ž .2
Ž . Ž . Ž .Note that 15 comes from constraint 9b and implies  T 	 0.2
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Hence, by 13 ,  t 	 0 for all t. From 11 , this in turn implies  t 	 02 1
for all t.
Let us now make the following observation:
PROPOSITION 1. If the budget B is finite, it is always optimal to spend the
whole budget,
D T  B. 16Ž . Ž .
Ž . Ž .Proof. Assume on the contrary that D T  B which, by 15 , implies
Ž . Ž . 0 and  t  0 for all t, because of 13 . Thus, the optimal solution,2
Ž .by 11 , would be E 	 for all t where   0, which at least holds on a1
Ž  Ž .final time interval, say 
 , T . However, by this solution constraint 8 is
violated.
The above proposition implies that an optimal crackdown enforcement
strategy necessarily exhausts the budget resources completely. This is
intuitively appealing and practically significant since it indirectly implies
that ‘‘left-over’’ resources can always be beneficially utilized and never
does it make sense to leave resources unused. This result is consistent with
the essence of the argument for the crackdown operation that a concen-
trated use of resources is beneficial.
The proof of Proposition 1 also shows that, in fact,   0, since2
otherwise  0 would imply E 	 for all t. On the other hand,   0 is1
clear since otherwise the Hamiltonian maximizing condition implies E 0
which again gives the worst solution possible.
In the next section we discuss the optimal policies.
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5. PROFILING THE OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT POLICY
To understand the characteristics of the optimal enforcement policy for
the BCOM, we consider the following three exhaustive casesrisk-seeking
Ž . Ž . Ž .dealer  1 , risk-neutral dealer  1 , and risk-averse dealer  1 .
5.1. Risk-Seeking DealersDecreasing Returns to Scale of Enforcement
In this case  1 and the Hamiltonian is strictly concave in E. There-
fore the optimal E is continuous over time and follows the differential
equation
c E1 1E˙    1 N   . 17Ž . Ž .01  NŽ .
To understand the implications of this equation, we present the follow-
ing proposition.
PROPOSITION 2. For the monotonicity of enforcement effort we hae to
consider two cases:
˙Ž . Ža when  	 1 then E 0 is always optimal ramp-up enforce-
.ment ;
 ˙Ž .  4  4 Ž .b when   1 then E 0 if N N with N from 5 .min min 
We can now analyze the phase diagram for   1 and  1, which
Ž .is depicted in Fig. 2. Proposition 2 b is reflected in the position of the
˙vertical part of the E 0 isocline which is exactly at NN . Thismin
implies that the enforcement decreases for NN while E increases formin
˙NN . The N 0 isocline is the same as in Fig. 1.min
FIG. 2. The phase diagram for   1 and  1.
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ˆ ˆ 1 1Ž . Ž .The equilibrium N , E with EN N  w is unstable,min min 0
˙Žsince the Jacobian determinant is note that EE 0 in this equilib-
. Ž  .rium see Feichtinger and Hartl 8 ,
 1    1 c2Ž . Ž . 1 3 ˆN E  0.min1 
Ž .The other equilibrium N , 0 is a saddle point, since the Jacobianmax
determinant becomes
2 1  cŽ . 1 3 1 N      1 N  0,Ž .max 01 
when approaching this equilibrium. Note that while
˙N
1  c E N1E
˙ ˙Ž .Ž .tends to minus infinity, the product NE EN tends to zero when
approaching this equilibrium.
The proposition is best understood in the context of the highest attrac-
Ž .tive state of the market to a dealer, N ; see 5 . From Fig. 1 it is clearmin
Žthat if NN , and as N decreases caused by the current crackdownmin
.effort , more enforcement intensity will become necessary to reduce the
number of dealers. In other words, the market appears more attractive to a
dealer therefore requiring an increased enforcement-intensity as a func-
˙tion of timeE 0as the proposition suggests. This argument also
holds for the first part of the proposition where N  0 ensuring thatmin
NN .min
On the other hand, when NN , the enforcement pressure felt by anmin
individual dealer is large making it exceedingly difficult for dealers to deal.
˙Therefore, a reduced enforcement effort may be acceptableE 0as
suggested in the second part of the proposition.
Solution Procedure. Since the transversality conditions do not give the
Ž . Ž .values of E T and N T , it is not immediately clear which of the various
Ž .solution candidates extremals of the canonical system represents the
Ž .optimal solution. The answer is that for a given N 0 , the corresponding
Ž . Ž . Ž .E 0 has to be chosen such that the solution of system 7 and 17 satisfies
Ž .the budget constraint 16 .
Ž .For a small budget and NN the equilibrium for E 0 we havemax
trajectory I in Fig. 2. For a moderate budget, starting from NN , wemax
have trajectory II.
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If N is very small and B is also very small, then trajectory III could
occur where N increases initially. At first sight, this is not a realistic
situation, since at the beginning of a crackdown N is usually large.
However, it could occur if in a previous period a crackdown was carried
out which reduced the number of dealers but not enough to collapse the
market. Trajectory III signals a point of caution for enforcement person-
nel. The lesson here is that ‘‘a small drug market does not automatically
justify a small crackdown budget as it may be counterproductive.’’
Next, the solution procedure1 is illustrated via an example.
EXAMPLE. To illustrate this solution methodology we choose the fol-
lowing parameter values from illicit drug sales estimates in Washington
  ŽDC 2 : N  100,   50 typical reservation wage per dealer per day0 0
. Žbased on a monthly average of $1046 ,  0.5,  500 estimate based
.on N N .0 max
 However, different from Baveja et al. 2 we initially choose  0.6.
Baveja’s original choice of  1 leads to a convex problem which is dealt
with in the next section. Note that   1 and  1 so that Fig. 2
applies.
For these values we obtain
N  2.78, N  100,min max
ˆand the enforcement effort in the unstable equilibrium E $185,000.
Proposition 2 implies that the enforcement effort is increasing over time
except when N 2.78 in which case it is decreasing. Now for a typical
crackdown time interval of T 7 days we have plotted the above men-
Ž . Ž . Ž .tioned diagram E 0 vs D T for different initial budgets B Fig. 3 .
Assuming an average weekly salary of $1,200 per enforcement officer,
the personnel cost of 20 officers would be $24,000week. For the round-
the-clock three eight-hour shift schedule, this would imply a cost of
$72,000 for a week. With some additional overheads we estimated the
budget of a weeklong crackdown operation to be $84,000. For a given
budget, in our case for B $84,000, we can obtain that the initial
enforcement should be about $369 per day. For a given budget, e.g., again
for B $84,000, we can also look at the enforcement profile, i.e., at the
Ž . Ž .time path of E t Fig. 4 .
From the figure it is clear that we have obtained an extreme ramp-up
enforcement profile. This is consistent with the claim of Proposition 2
˙where   1 and NN , implying E 0. Intuitively, enforcement’smin
1 Ž . Ž .For a given N 0 the amount of budget D T used up by the terminal time T according to
Ž . Ž . Ž .9a will be an increasing function of E 0 . Thus we have to find an E 0 value such that
Ž .D T  B. This is illustrated next via an example.
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Ž .FIG. 3. Budget used, D T , within T 7 days, starting from different initial enforcement
Ž .levels E 0 and following the canonical system.
FIG. 4. The optimal enforcement profile for a budget B $84,000 over the planning
interval of T 7 days.
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Žeffect is most felt when N decreases i.e., later in the crackdown opera-
. Ž .tion resulting in the risk factor  EN to increase making dealers
leave the market. Practically, the ramp-up strategy has a psychological
benefitthe maximum impact of the crackdown will be felt towards the
end of the crackdown operation, an important morale booster for law
enforcement agencies, which may convince residents, activists, and city
officials to commit additional ongoing resources for follow-up neighbor-
hood revitalization efforts.
It is also instructive to plot how the number of dealers evolves over time
as a reaction to the crackdown enforcement. Figure 5 shows that starting
Ž . Ž .from N 0  100 the dealer population decreases to N T  8.5. This
optimal crackdown effect is compared with the constant enforcement
ŽE $12,000 spreading the B $84,000 equally over the 7 days Figs. 4
.and 5 . It is clear from the figures that while the higher enforcement effort
up-front in the case of constant enforcement yields very little benefit, the
additional resources towards the end in the case of the optimal strategy
Ž .indeed are very beneficial. This results in N 7  40 for the case of
Ž .constant enforcement versus N 7  8.5 for the optimal strategy.
Ž .Comparing the terminal dealer level N T  8.5 in Fig. 5 to N  2.78min
ˆŽ .and the terminal enforcement level E T  120,000 in Fig. 4 to E
185,000, we see that our numerical example represents a part of trajectory
Ž .I or II in Fig. 2 never reaching N due to budget constraints .min
Sensitiity w.r.t. Time and Budget. If the horizon time is increased from
1 week to 2 weeks, then spreading the same budget B $84,000 optimally
Ž .over T 14 days brings only a marginal reduction of final level, N T ,
Ž . Ž .compared to T 7; now we have N 14  7.9 rather than N 7  8.5.
FIG. 5. The time path of the dealers as they leave the market in case of optimal usage of
budget B $84,000 over the planning interval of T 7 days.
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Ž .FIG. 6. The outcome of the crackdown, N T , as a function of available time, T , for
different values of budget B.
In order to see the effect of available budget, B, and time, T , on the
Ž . Ž .outcome N T of the crackdown, we plot N T for different values of B
and T in Fig. 6. From this figure it is easily obtained that increasing the
budget sufficiently beyond $84,000 will lead to a market collapse, thus a
situation where the number of dealers is reduced to zero.2
Figure 6 offers two clear policy implications relevant to this example:
Ž . Ž1 A reduction in budget to $70,000 compared to the earlier
.$84,000 can have a severe detrimental effect and could jeopardize the
success of the crackdown operation. In real terms, since the average
personnel cost of a police officer for a 24-hour day is approximately $3,600
this reduction can be translated to two less officers or one less patrol car.
This underscores the importance of each patrol car on the street during a
crackdown operation.
Ž .2 Figure 6 also indicates that a crackdown length of one week
seems reasonable. Less than one week leads to a significantly less impact
in reducing the number of dealers. On the other hand, a time period
greater than one week does not yield any additional significant benefits.
This result is both important and consistent with the findings of Baveja
 et al. 2 where they showed that a crackdown’s value could be gauged soon
often during a week of crackdown.
2 It turned out that it was very difficult to numerically compute a solution where such a
market collapse actually occurs. This difficulty lies in the fact that for E 0 and N 0
˙ ˙Ž .approaching the E-axis it holds that E	 and N	.
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5.2. Non-risk-seeking DealersConstant and Increasing Returns to Scale
of Enforcement
In case of decreasing returns to scale of enforcement,  1, the
Hamiltonian was strictly concave in E. Therefore the optimal E was
Ž .continuous over time and was uniquely given by the solution of Eq. 11 .
This is no longer true in the case of constant returns to scale of enforce-
Ž .ment,  1 risk-neutral dealers , or increasing returns to scale of en-
Ž .forcement,  1 risk-averse dealers , where the Hamiltonian is linear or
convex in the control E. Here the optimal strategy could suggest use of
infinite values of the enforcement, E, which are obviously unrealistic.
Therefore, for 
 1 it is necessary to have a realistic upper bound E.
The decision problem now becomes
minimize er TN T , 6Ž . Ž .
subject to
E
1N˙ c N    , N 0 N , 7Ž . Ž .1 0 0ž /N
D˙ E, D 0  0, 9aŽ . Ž .
D T 	 B , 9bŽ . Ž .
0	 E	 E. 18Ž .
It will turn out that the cases  1 and  1 have the same optimal
solutions. Thus, in order to avoid repeating arguments, we first analyze a
linearized control problem that will then give the optimal solution for both
cases.
Linearization of the Conex Case. In case of increasing returns to scale
Ž .  of enforcement,  1, we replace the function h E, N  E N by the
 1˜ ˜Ž . Ž . Ž .function h E, N  gN E with g E . Thus h E, N is linear in E.
Furthermore it holds that
h˜ 0, N  h 0, N 19Ž . Ž . Ž .
and
h˜ E, N  h E, N . 20Ž . Ž . Ž .
Ž . Ž . Ž .Due to 19 , 20 , and the convexity of h E, N in E, we obtain that
˜Ž . Ž .within the allowed control region it holds that h E, N 
 h E, N . We
conclude that the value of the Hamiltonian corresponding to the model
with the linear function represents an upper bound for the value of the
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Ž .Hamiltonian corresponding to the model with the convex function h E, N .
˜Ž .Now the plan is to derive the optimal solution for the model with h E, N ,
and then approach this solution as much as possible while solving the
original problem.
The model is
Max er TN T , 21Ž . Ž .
subject to
˙ 1 N c N  gEN  w , 22Ž . 41 0
D˙ E, D T 	 B , 23Ž . Ž .
0	 E	 E. 24Ž .
We now solve this linear model.
Solution for the Linearized Model. The Hamiltonian of this linear prob-
lem is
H  c N1  gEN w   E. 25Ž . 41 1 0 2
Then, with the switching function
H
  c gN   26Ž .1 1 2E
the necessary conditions are
 0   undefinedE for  0, 27Ž .½ 5   E
H
2 1˙  r    r c  1 N  c  gEN ,Ž . 41 1 1 1 1N
 T 1, 28Ž . Ž .1
˙  r ,  T 	 0. 29Ž . Ž .2 2 2
We identify 3 possible paths for positive N depending on the value of E
relative to its boundary:
Path 1. Maximum enforcement E E.
Path 2. Interior enforcement 0 E E.
Path 3. Zero enforcement E 0.
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Using the necessary conditions we can prove the following proposition:
Ž . Ž .PROPOSITION 3. a A singular control Path 2 can only happen for
NN andmin
w 1 0 E E  N . 30Ž .min½ 5g   1
Ž .  Ž .b A switch to and from E E Path 2 is only possible for
NN .min
Ž . Ž . Ž .c A switch from E 0 Path 3 to E E Path 1 is only possible
for N
N .min
Ž . Ž . Ž .d A switch from E E Path 1 to E 0 Path 3 is only possible
for N	N .min
The proof is deferred to the Appendix. In the Appendix we also prove
that it is not possible to connect Path 2 with any other path, so that it
represents a hairline case which need not be considered any further. This
is also in accordance with economic intuition since following Path 2 would
mean staying at the level N which is not very reasonable because at thismin
level the attractiveness of the market for new dealers is particularly high.
This yields the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 4. The only possible sequences are . . . Path 3 Path 1
Path 3 Path 1 and . . . Path 1 Path 3 Path 1 Path 3.
The necessary conditions are satisfied by the following sequences con-
sisting of only two paths:
 Ramp-Up Sequence. Path 3 Path 1, i.e., E 0 on 0, t and E E31
 on t , T , where N
N at the coupling time t . In most situations31 min 31
Ž .where N N i.e., the market is at a high stable level of dealers , the0 max
Ttime t is chosen such that H E dt B. In words, the crackdown oper-31 t31
Ž .ation will be delayed until time t to ensure that there are enough31
resources to sustain the maximum intensity of E E until the end of the
operation.
 Ramp-Down Sequence. Path 1 Path 3, i.e., E E on 0, t and13
 E 0 on t , T , where N	N at the coupling time t . This can be13 min 13
considered a ramp-down strategy, where the policy E E is followed
initially until the budget is used up.
Note that this sequence cannot be optimal if NN at the couplingmin
time, which happens if, for example, the budget is too small andor N is0
too large.
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This policy will be optimal, if using E E in a certain interval of length
Ž .t makes the market collapse, N t  0, and if the budget is large13 13
enough, B
 t E. After the market collapses at time t , enforcement E13 13
can be reduced to zero and N will not increase again. This result suggests
putting all the resources up-front and with sufficient budget availability,
can actually result in a market collapse by time t . Of course once the13
Žmarket collapses no crackdown enforcement will be required recall that
since E is the crackdown enforcement in addition to the baseline level, a
.maintenance level would still be enforced .
From a practical standpoint it seems reasonable to expect a ramp-up
sequence to be optimal when budget is insufficient to result in a significant
collapse using the resources available. The argument for this would be as
follows: if a ramp-down sequence is used in such a low-budget scenario,
after the switch to zero enforcement when the market is ‘‘still around,’’ the
market will grow and flourish suggesting that the ramp-up rather than
ramp-down sequence may be beneficial. On the other hand, if sufficient
enforcement resources are available for effecting a market collapse, the
ramp-down sequence seems reasonable.
While it is an open question whether and in what situation sequences of
3 or more paths could be optimal, our conjecture is that such sequences
will never be optimal.
Solution for the Non-risk-seeking Dealers Model. The results of the
previous subsection immediately apply to the case of risk-neutral dealers,
 1, where we simply set  g 1.
Let us now turn to the case of increasing returns to scale of enforcement
Ž .  risk-averse dealers ,  1, as was suggested by Baveja et al. 2 . As in the
previous subsection, it is necessary to have an upper bound E on enforce-
ment in order to prevent infinite values of E.
We note that for  1 the Hamiltonian
E
1H  c N      E1 1 0 2ž /N
is now strictly convex in the control, so that the Hamiltonian maximizing
Ž .condition is similar to 27 for the linearized model,
10  1E if  c  E , 31Ž .1 1 2½ 5½ 5 NE
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while now interior controls 0 E E cannot occur and in the hairline
case E 0 or E E can be optimal. It is easy to show the following
result:
PROPOSITION 5. The optimal solution is the same as the optimal solution
Ž . Ž .of the linearized model 21  24 .
Proof. We know that the value of the objective function of this linear
Ž .maximization model is an upper bound for the original model, since the
effectiveness of enforcement is the same at the boundaries and is higher in
the interior. Now, from the previous section we know that the optimal
solution of the linearized model will only consist of paths with boundary
controls E 0 and E E, respectively. Thus the objective value of this
solution for the original convex problem is the same as the objective value
in the linearized model so that it is also optimal in the original convex
problem.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Using optimal control theory, this paper analyzed the question of
optimal drug crackdown enforcement policy, subject to a budget con-
straint. Based on the analysis of Caulkins’ dynamic crackdown model,
several insights were derived aimed at providing assistance to law enforce-
ment managers in implementing drug crackdown operations. First, our
analysis shows that in most realistic situations it is always optimal to use
the entire enforcement budget. In other words, it rarely makes sense to
leave unused resources, suggesting that a concentration of resources is
indeed beneficial.
 Second, combining the results of Baveja et al. 2 for the risk-averse
dealer and those from our analysis for the risk-seeking dealer, it is
reasonable to expect a crackdown operations’ success to be gauged within
a short period of timee.g., a week. If crackdown operations will be
Žsuccessful, one can usually see it happening in a matter of days and not
.months . This is consistent with the findings of actual crackdown opera-
tionsboth successful and unsuccessful. For example, the Buffalo, NY,
police department undertook a crackdown operation ‘‘STORM’’ in 1991
1992, which eventually was called off after 14 months when success seemed
unlikely. Our model argues that the lack of success in such cases is due to
the resources being distributed over longer time duration instead of
concentrating them for a shorter, more forceful operation. The model also
questions the validity of waiting such a long time before recognizing the
failure of the operation and suggests making a determination within a
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matter of a week or so, which could save valuable resources in the long
run.
Third, the paper shows that the optimal enforcement profile is a
function of the risk aversion of a drug dealer. If the dealers are risk-seek-
ing, the profit-making opportunity the latter part of the crackdown opera-
Ž .tion offers due to fewer competitors will make dealing attractive to them.
This in turn will make reducing the size of the market harder as the
operation progresses, suggesting use of an enforcement effort that in-
Žcreases with time. On the other hand, if the dealers are risk averse or
.even risk neutral , the optimal strategy is one of using maximum resources
as soon as the operation begins, until the market collapses.3 One can
rightly question the usefulness of these findings given that estimating the
risk aversion of a drug dealer is difficult. Studying the economics of a drug
 market, Nell 17 finds that law enforcement efforts catch the amateurs
and the unorganized dealers improving market position of the more
seasoned ones. Based on this finding, one possible characterization of a
risk-averse dealer in Caulkins’ model could be to consider them as sea-
soned and experienced. While this non-rigorous categorization of dealers
may not be entirely accurate, it may still be a good starting point, useful
for estimating the risk profile of a dealera parameter the model clearly
identifies as important in determining the most efficient way of allocating
crackdown enforcement resources. Finally, as mentioned earlier, a drug
crackdown can never be successful in isolation and requires a post-crack-
down effort as well. Typically, a crackdown operation is followed by a
revitalization initative aimed at normalizing the functioning of the area via
improved street lighting, safe housing, and efforts to relocate businesses
and facilities to the neighborhood. Further, a maintenance enforcement
level is needed to prevent a drug-market spring back especially in the case
when crackdown budget was insufficient to result in a complete market
collapse. It could be argued that the resources spent on this post-crack-
down effort would be an increasing function of the number of dealers at
the end of the crackdown phase, a quantity that our model minimized.
Thus our model’s results indirectly help reduce the resources spent on
follow-up operations. Our model did not explicitly incorporate the costs of
follow-up operations since, often, these resources come from sources other
than law-enforcement agencies, e.g., citymayor and federal empowerment
funds. However, it is not difficult to see that any additional term in the
3 This assumes that enough budget is available. In the case of insufficient budget availabil-
ity, the optimal strategy is one of waiting and then using the maximum enforcement until the
end of the crackdown period.
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Ž .objective function which is an increasing function of N T will not alter
the optimal enforcement profile the current model outputs.
The abovementioned results, while significant, are clearly limited by the
simplifying assumptions the model makes. The drug-dealing activity being
modeled is illegal and consensual, making it difficult to measure directly,
which makes certain assumptions necessary from a modeling standpoint.
Despite these underlying limiting assumptions, we do believe that the
model is a reasonable approximation of reality for several reasons. First, a
profit-risk tradeoff framework which the model uses and the accompanying
underlying utility dynamics are a good estimate of the mental model of a
money-driven activity. Further, the key characteristics of the dynamics in
Ž .this model are that the actors dealers in this case flow in or out of the
market in a self-interested manner, there is enforcement swamping, and
the benefit of participating in the ‘‘market’’ is a decreasing function of the
number of people in the market. These properties are so general that the
basic model can be safely considered a good approximation of reality, and
in fact, may also be applicable to purveyors of any black market commod-
ity like, e.g., prostitution, numbers running, etc., or even burglary. Whether
this modeling framework is indeed applicable to other illegal activities
requires further investigation and is suggested as a direction for future
research.
Another major limitation of the analysis presented here is that displace-
ment of a dealer to other neighborhoods due to a crackdown operation has
 been essentially ignored. But as Baveja et al. 2 argue displacement, while
an important factor, cannot be used as a reason to disregard the model or
argue against the effectiveness of crackdowns. Further, recent empirical
 study 16 reported little evidence of displacement of criminal activity to
 neighboring areas. Additionally, some researchers argue 7 that since
displacement could take the form of fewer negative externalities, a crack-
down operation could still be beneficial despite occurrence of displace-
ment. While these arguments do not justify not explicitly incorporating
displacement in our model, it does offer some validity to the simplifying
assumption.
With a growing effort among cities to reclaim crime-infested neighbor-
hoods, the strategy of concentrating resources will probably be widely used
in the future. However, many such operations that involve a concentration
of resources may not be ‘‘crackdowns’’ in the restricted way this paper
defines. Nevertheless, Caulkins’ model and the accompanying analysis may
prove to be useful framework for defining a broader crackdown model
one which will have wider applicability to a variety of ‘‘clean-up’’ local
enforcement operations that restrictimpedearrest illegal activitiesop-
erations of individual criminals making decisions based on profit-risk
tradeoffs.
OPTIMAL CONTROL OF CRACKDOWN 75
7. APPENDIX
7.1. Proof of Proposition 3
Ž .Let us first compute the derivative of the switching function 26 ,
˙  1 ˙ ˙ c gN   c gN N  32Ž .˙ 1 1 1 1 2
provided that this derivative exists. Otherwise this formula holds for the
Ž .one-sided derivatives because of 26 and because these derivatives exist
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .for N,  , and  . Substitution of 22 , 28 , and 29 into 32 implies1 2
 rc gN   c2 g  1 N2  c2 g 2EN21Ž .˙ 1 1 1 1 1 1
  c2 gN2   c2 g 2EN21   c2 gw N1  r .1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2
Rewriting gives
 rc gN   c2 g   1 N2Ž .˙ 1 1 1 1
  c2 gw N1  r . 33Ž .1 1 0 2
Ž .Now 26 can be used to simplify this further:
2 1 1 r  c gN   1 N   w . 34Ž . Ž .˙ 1 1 0
Ž . Ž .Proof of Part a and b . On a singular arc we have  0 and
Ž .therefore  0. From 34 we can conclude that˙
Ž . Ž .1 1 1 1  1 
NN  ,min ž /ž / 0
Ž .which is the same as 5 in the main paper. This in turn implies that
 w N  w w0 min 0 0 1 E E  N  N min min½ 5g g   1 g gŽ .
Ž .which can be simplified to 30 .
Ž .This completes the proof of a and, by continuity of the state N, the
Ž .proof of b .
Ž .Proof of Part c . A switch from path E 0 to path E E is only
possible for  0 and 
 0, or, at least,  0, 
 0, and 
 0.˙ ˙ ˙
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Ž . ŽFrom 34 we can derive that  0 and 
 0 leads to  ˙
. 11 N   w 	 0 which is equivalent to0
Ž . Ž .1 1 1 1  1 
N
N  .min ž /ž / 0
Ž . Ž .The proof of part d is completely analogous to that of part c .
7.2. The Coupling Procedure
The coupling procedure begins at the planning horizon and then works
Ž .backwards in time. Since the transversality conditions  T 1 and1
Ž . Ž Ž .. T 	 0 can hold on all paths cf. the switching function 26 all paths2
can be the final path. So we have three possibilities:
Ž .1 Path 1 with E E is the final path.
Ž . 2 Path 2 with E E is the final path.
Ž .3 Path 3 with E 0 is the final path.
Path 1 Is the Final Path. E E. At time T it holds that
 c gN   
 0 with  T 	 0 35Ž . Ž .1 2 2
which is possible.
Path 2 Path 1 is impossible. The continuity of the co-state variables
and N requires that
 t  0,  t 
 0, 36Ž . Ž .Ž .˙21 21
where t is the point of time where Path 2 passes into Path 1. From21
Ž . Ž .Proposition 3 b we know that N t N so that21 min
 2 1 1 t   c gN   1 N   w  0. 37Ž . Ž .Ž .˙ 21 1 1 0
Ž .Now it is interesting to compute the second derivative. From 34 , i.e.,
2 1 1 r  c gN   1 N   wŽ .˙ 1 1 0
we get the general expression
2 1d  c gNŽ .1 1 1 r   1 N   wŽ .¨ ˙ 0dt
2 1 2 ˙  c gN   1  1 N N . 38Ž . Ž . Ž .1 1
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Ž .By  0 and N t N at the point of coupling, the first two terms˙ 21 min
Ž .vanish and 38 becomes
 2 3 ˙  t  c g   1 1  N N t  0. 39Ž . Ž . Ž .Ž . Ž .¨ 21 1 1 21
Ž  . Ž  . Ž .Now  0,  t  0, and  t  0 imply that  t    0 for˙ ¨21 21 21
Ž .all positive  small enough which is a contradiction to E t    E.21
Path 3 Path 1 is only possible for NN . The continuity of themin
Ž . Ž  . Ž  .co-state variables and N requires that  t  0,  t 
 0,  t 
 0.˙ ˙31 31 31
Ž . Ž .From Proposition 3 c we know that N t 
N .31 min
Ž . Ž . Ž .Assume for the moment that N t N . By  t  0 and 34 this31 min 31
Ž  . Ž . Ž  .yields  t  0. As in 39 this implies  t  0 which again gives the˙ ¨31 21
Ž . Ž . Ž .contradiction  t    0 and E t    E. Thus only N t N21 21 31 min
is possible at the switching time. Then,
2 1 1 r  c gN   1 N   w  0,Ž .˙ 1 1 0
which is in accordance with switching from E 0 to E E.
Proceeding in this way gives . . . Path 3 Path 1 Path 3 Path 1.
Path 2 Is the Final Path. E E. At time T it holds that  c gN1
Ž .   0 with  T 	 0, which is clearly possible.2 2
Switching to Path 2 is not possible. This is because a t or t one12 32
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž  .would have N t N . By  t  0 and 34 this yields  t  0.˙x 2 min x 2 x 2
Ž .As in 39 this implies
 2 3 ˙  t  c g   1 1  N N t  0Ž . Ž .Ž . Ž .¨ 32 1 1 32
˙ Ž . Ž .because of E 0 on Path 3 and thus N t  0. With  t  0 and32 x 2
Ž  . Ž . Ž t  0 this again gives the contradiction  t    0 against E t˙ x 2 32 32
.   0.
On the other hand
 2 3 ˙  t  c g   1 1  N N t  0Ž . Ž .Ž . Ž .¨ 12 1 1 12
Ž˙ . Ž .because of E E on Path 1 and thus N t  0. With  t  0 and32 x 2
Ž  . Ž . Ž t  0 this again gives the contradiction  t    0 against E t˙ x 2 12 12
.   E.
Notice that having Path 2 throughout is a hairline case,4 since it can
Ž . T only occur when N 0 N and H E dt B. Thus we need not con-min 0
sider Path 2 any further.
4 Furthermore, it is economically clear that path 2 will not be used, since thereat
N the market is particularly attractive for new dealers and thus keeping N constant atmin
this level is certainly expensive and not reasonable.
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Path 3 Is the Final Path: E 0. At time T it holds that  c gN 1
Ž . 	 0 with  T 	 0, which is possible.2 2
Path 2 Path 3 is impossible. The proof is the same as with Path
2 Path 1 above.
Path 1 Path 3 is only possible for NN . The proof is the same asmin
with Path 3 Path 1 above.
According to the previous arguments the resulting sequence will become
. . . Path 1 Path 3 Path 1 Path 3.
REFERENCES
1. A. Barnett, Drug crackdowns and crime rates: A comment on the Kleiman report, in
Ž .‘‘Street-Level Drug Enforcement: Examining the Issues’’ Marcia R. Chaiken, Ed. ,
National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC, 1988.
2. A. Baveja, R. Batta, J. P. Caulkins, and M. H. Karwan, When haste makes sense:
Ž .Cracking down on street market for illicit drugs, Socio-Econ. Plan. Sci. 31 1997 ,
293306.
3. A. Baveja, R. Batta, J. P. Caulkins, and M. H. Karwan, Modeling the response of illicit
Ž .drug market to local enforcement, Socio-Econ. Plan. Sci. 27 1993 , 7389.
4. J. P. Caulkins, ‘‘The Distribution and Consumption of Illicit Drugs: Some Mathematical
Models and Their Policy Implications,’’ Ph.D. Dissertation, Operations Research Center,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 1990.
5. J. P. Caulkins, Mathematical models of drug markets and drug policy, Oper. Res. 41
Ž .1993 , 848863.
6. J. P. Caulkins, R. C. Larson, and T. F. Rich, Geography’s impact on the success of
Ž .focused local drug enforcement operations, Socio-Econ. Plan. Sci. 27 1993 , 119130.
7. J. P. Caulkins, Thinking about displacement in drug markets: Why observing change of
Ž .venue isn’t enough, J. Drug Issues 22 1991 , 1730.
¨8. G. Feichtinger and R. F. Hartl, ‘‘Optimale Kontrolle Okonomischer Prozesse,’’ de
Gruyter, Berlin, 1986.
9. J. Forero, Police drug squad winning support of residents, in ‘‘The Buffalo News,’’ pp. B1,
B6, August 26, 1990.
10. J. G. Hagga and P. Reuter, ‘‘The Limits of the Czar’s Ukase: Drug Policy at the Local
Level,’’ N-3171-DPRC, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1990.
11. D. Kennedy, ‘‘Fighting the Drug Trade in Link Valley,’’ C16-90-935.0, John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University, MA, 1990.
12. M. A. R. Kleiman, Crackdowns: The effects of intensive enforcement on retail heroin
Ždealing, in ‘‘Street-Level Drug Enforcement: Examining the Issues’’ M. R. Chaiken,
.Ed. , National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC, 1988.
13. M. A. R. Kleiman, ‘‘Against Excess: Drug Policy for Results,’’ Basic Books, New York,
1992.
14. P. M. Kort, G. Feichtinger, R. F. Hartl, and J. L. Haunschmied, Optimal enforcement
Ž . Ž .policies crackdown on a drug market, Optimal Control Appl. Methods 19 1998 ,
169184.
15. A. V. Naik, A. Baveja, R. Batta, and J. P. Caulkins, Theory and methodology: Scheduling
Ž .crackdowns on illicit drug markets, European J. Oper. Res. 88 1996 , 231250.
OPTIMAL CONTROL OF CRACKDOWN 79
16. National Institute of Justice, Policing drug hotspots, in ‘‘NIJ Research Preview,’’ Wash-
ington, DC, January 1996.
Ž .17. E. J. Nell, The dynamics of the drug market, Challenge 37 1994 , 1321.
18. C. P. Rydell, J. P. Caulkins, and S. S. Everingham, Enforcement or treatment? Modeling
Ž .the relative efficacy of alternatives for controlling cocaine, Oper. Res. 44 1996 , 687695.
19. L. W. Sherman, Police crackdowns: Initial and residential deterrence, in ‘‘Crime and
Ž .Justice: A Review of Research’’ M. Tony and N. Morris, Eds. , Vol. 12, Univ. of Chicago
Press, Chicago, 1990.
20. R. E. Worden, T. S. Bynum, and J. Frank, ‘‘Drugs and the Criminal Justice System,’’
Sage, Beverley Hills, CA, 1992.
21. L. Zimmer, ‘‘Operation Pressure Point: The Disruption of Street-Level Drug Trade on
New York’s Lower East Side,’’ Occasional Papers from The Center for Research in
Crime and Justice, New York University School of Law, New York, 1987.
